

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 211407

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS FROM SAUNDERS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR IS US XF

SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY

1. SIMCHA DINITZ TODAY (FRIDAY, AUGUST 18) INVITED ME TO LUNCH AND THEN IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD, HE, BAR-ON, AND I WENT TO SEE THE SECRETARY. SIMCHA'S MESSAGE TO BOTH OF US WAS THE SAME. I WILL RECOUNT BELOW HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY AND THEN, SINCE WHAT HE SAID TO HIM WAS EXACTLY PARALLEL ON THE POINTS HE RAISED WITH ME, I WILL ADD AT THE END ONLY A COUPLE OF ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH CAME IN MY LUNCHEON CONVERSATION.

2. SIMCHA'S MAIN POINT WAS THAT HIS LEADERS ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE SUMMIT. A GREAT DEAL RIDES ON ITS SUCCESS FOR THE U.S., FOR ISRAEL, AND FOR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 211407

PEACE. AFTER TALKING WITH HIS MINISTERS, HE PROPOSES THAT WE CONSULT CLOSELY BEFORE THE MEETING--NOT SO THAT ISRAEL CAN PROBE U.S. THINKING BUT SO THAT ISRAELI LEADERS CAN COME TO CAMP DAVID HAVING HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK THROUGH THEIR RESPONSES TO IDEAS THAT MAY BE RAISED THERE. THE OBJECT IS TO BRING THE ISRAELI MINISTERS TO CAMP DAVID AS WELL PREPARED AS POSSIBLE.

3. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED

THAT HE WOULD BE AWAY FROM WASHINGTON ON A ONE-WEEK VACATION, DURING WHICH TIME THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE DIGESTING THE PRELIMINARY PAPERS WE HAD GIVEN HIM FOR HIS PREPARATIONS FOR CAMP DAVID. THE SECRETARY PROPOSED THAT HE AND SIMCHA GET TOGETHER AGAIN SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN. FYI: WE HAD ALREADY BEEN THINKING THAT, ABOUT THAT TIME, WE SHOULD BE READY TO GIVE YOU INSTRUCTIONS FOR A DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE YOUR RETURN. END FYI.

4. SECRETARY RESPONDED TO SIMCHA'S INITIAL PRESENTATION BY SAYING IT IS IMPORTANT FOR EVERYONE COMING TO CAMP DAVID TO LOOK AT THE KEY ISSUES. A GREAT DEAL OF COMMON GROUND HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OUR MAIN DIFFICULTIES WILL NOT BE IN THOSE AREAS. THE DIFFICULT ISSUES LIE IN THE AREAS OF WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY, AND THE FATE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THESE ARE THE TOUGH ISSUES, THE SECRETARY SAID, THAT WE JUST HAVE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO. WHAT WE OUGHT TO THINK ABOUT BETWEEN NOW AND THEN IS HOW TO BRIDGE THE GAPS ON TWO TOUGH ISSUES: (1) WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AND (2) HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUES AFTER FIVE YEARS. (SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THOSE ISSUES WITHIN THE FIVE-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 211407

YEAR PERIOD ALSO, BUT THAT SEEMS EASIER TO WORK OUT.)

5. DINITZ THEN ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND THE SECRETARY RESPONDED BRIEFLY:

Q. DO YOU SEE A SUMMIT AS THE FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS PRODUCING SOME FORMULATIONS AND SOME SUBSTANCE?

A. I SEE IT AS PRODUCING GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

Q. DO YOU BELIEVE EGYPT WANTS GUIDELINES JUST TO COVER THE SINAI OR THE WEST BANK AS WELL?

A. BOTH. I BELIEVE THEY WANT TO PROCEED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SINAI BUT THEY ALSO WANT GUIDELINES THAT CAN PROVIDE A BASIS FOR BRINGING JORDAN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE A FEELING THAT THE SINAI NEGOTIATIONS COULD GO VERY FAST. BUT THE LEADERS HAVE TO OVERCOME THE CHASM THAT EXISTS ON THE WEST BANK.

Q. I SEEM TO READ U.S. COMMENTS AS NOT CONSIDERING "GESTURES" AS IMPORTANT. DO YOU FEEL THAT PROPOSALS FOR ESTABLISHING SOMETHING LESS THAN TOTAL PEACE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED?

A. ONLY AS AN ALTERNATIVE. THERE IS NO REAL INTEREST IN THESE.

Q. I NOTED THAT YOU DID NOT PUT MUCH EMPHASIS ON THEM. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS BEEN DISCUSSING RECENTLY AN IDEA OF PERMANENT INTERIM AGREEMENTS.

A. ONLY IN CASE ALL ELSE FAILS. WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 211407

AN OBJECTIVE AS SUCH. IT MAY NOT EVEN BE VIABLE. SADAT IS CONCERNED ABOUT NOT APPEARING TO MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE. IF HE FELT ABLE TO DO THAT HE WOULD GO AHEAD AND REACH AGREEMENT ON THE WHOLE SINAI. THE PROBLEM WITH INTERIM STEPS IS THAT IT WOULD BUY HIM THE DISADVANTAGES OF A SEPARATE PEACE WITHOUT THE FULL ADVANTAGES. I HOPE EGYPT AND ISRAEL WILL COME WITH A SPIRIT OF FLEXIBILITY.

Q. IS A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES--NOTICE THAT I AVOID USING THE CODEWORD "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES"--A VEHICLE NEEDED TO CREATE THE GUIDELINES, NOT SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF?

A. WE SEE SOME SUCH STATEMENT AS NECESSARY, BUT IT COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ANOTHER INSTRUMENT WHICH WOULD CONTAIN MORE DETAILED GUIDANCE.

6. SECRETARY THEN EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD GIVEN THE PRESIDENT TODAY A BOOK OF OUR INITIAL PAPERS IN PREPARATION FOR CAMP DAVID AND HOW WE SEE THE TALKS PROCEEDING. SECRETARY SAID HE HAD URGED THAT WE NOT TRY TO RUSH MATTERS, THAT THE ISSUES ARE TOO IMPORTANT FOR TRYING TO SETTLE THEM IN 2-3 DAYS.

7. SECRETARY WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT WE SAW FIRST ROUND OF TALKS LEADING UP TO A RECESS FOR SHABAT WITH RESUMPTION ON SUNDAY. OUR VIEW--AND HE SUGGESTED SIMCHA PASS THIS ON TO THE PRIME MINISTER--IS THAT THE MEETINGS MIGHT LAST UP TO A WEEK.

8. SIMCHA ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE THERE THE WHOLE TIME OR WHETHER HE WOULD BE IN AND OUT. SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 211407

SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD BE THERE THE WHOLE TIME AND REPEATED OUR HOPE THAT THE RHETORIC WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL.

9. CHANGING THE SUBJECT, SECRETARY SAID HE WAS A LITTLE TROUBLED BY SOME OF THE THINGS HE HAD SEEN IN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COLLEGE. HE WONDERED WHETHER THESE WERE PROMPTED SIMPLY BY THE AUDIENCE TO WHICH BEGIN WAS SPEAKING. SIMCHA SAID HE THOUGHT THAT WAS THE CASE. HE NOTED THAT REPORTS COMING FROM SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. HAD INDICATED CONCERN OVER EGYPTIAN MILITARY BUILDUP AND THE DANGER OF OCTOBER. BEGIN HAD TO RESPOND TO A GENERAL QUESTION IN THE AIR IN ISRAEL--WHETHER ISRAEL IS NEGOTIATING WITHOUT PAYING ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO ITS MILITARY PREPARATIONS.

10. SECRETARY STATED HIS OWN BELIEF THAT SADAT CLEARLY DOES NOT INTEND TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES IN OCTOBER. HE NOTED--AND SIMCHA ACKNOWLEDGED--THAT HE HAD SENT THIS WORD EARLIER TO BEGIN THROUGH QUANDT. SIMCHA CONTINUED THAT WEIZMAN DID NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OF PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES, AND SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EVERYONE OUGHT TO BE PREPARED.

11. CLOSING DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT, SIMCHA SPECULATED THAT PRIME MINISTER MIGHT HAVE BEEN UNHAPPY WITH TALK OF POSSIBLE WAR COMING FROM THE U.S. BECAUSE HE MIGHT HAVE SEEN THAT AS A FORM OF PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. I THEN MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER THEME IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH THAT HAD STRUCK US--NAMELY THE RECURRENT TALK OF PERMANENT PARTIAL SETTLEMENTS. DINITZ SAID HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN BORN OF SADAT'S IDEA OF A "GESTURE" PUT TO WEIZMAN IN SALZBURG. SIMCHA FELT BEGIN MAY HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT SADAT HIMSELF IS LOOKING FOR WAYS OF SETTLING FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN TOTAL PEACE. SECRETARY RESPONDED FIRMLY THAT IT MIGHT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 211407

BE USEFUL FOR SIMCHA TO PASS TO PRIME MINISTER SECRETARY'S IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS NOT REPEAT NOT SADAT'S VIEW.

12. IN BRIEF FINAL WORD ABOUT WHO WILL COME, SIMCHA SAID WHAT EPPIE HAD ALREADY TOLD YOU, THAT BURG'S ATTENDANCE WOULD BE DECIDED AT THE CABINET A WEEK FROM SUNDAY. SIMCHA NOTED THAT BURG HAD ALREADY SAID PUBLICLY

THAT HE FELT THOSE INVOLVED SHOULD BE INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THEIR FUNCTION IN THE CABINET. HOWEVER, THERE SEEMED TO BE STRONG PRESSURE FROM WITHIN NRP.

13. EVERYTHING IN MY LUNCHEON DISCUSSION WITH SIMCHA AND HANON WAS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE SECRETARY TOLD THEM, BUT WE DID SPEND MORE TIME ON ONE POINT WHICH I SHOULD REPEAT FOR YOU.

14. I SAID THAT IN THINKING ABOUT HOW TO PREPARE FOR DISCUSSIONS AMONG HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, I HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE MANY NEW ELEMENTS WHICH HAD COME ONTO THE SCENE SINCE RESOLUTION 242 WAS WRITTEN. I STRESSED THAT WE ALL WANTED TO PRESERVE 242 WHICH, WITH 338, IS THE ONLY AGREED BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE. HOWEVER, I FELT THAT SOME OF THE WORDS WE HAD USED FOR SO LONG NOW HAD SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT MEANINGS AND APPLICATIONS. FOR INSTANCE, WE USED TO TALK ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. NOW WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ISRAELI SECURITY PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK. WE HAVE LIVED FOR ALMOST 11 YEARS WITH OPEN BORDERS BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL SO WE ARE NO LONGER REALLY THINKING ABOUT A BORDER THAT WOULD BE A SHARP DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS. MY POINT, I SAID, WAS THAT I FELT THE PRINCIPALS AT CAMP DAVID MIGHT DO BETTER THAN SOME OF US IN LOOKING AT THE SPECIFIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 211407

PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED AND THEN TRYING TO CAPTURE IN FAIRLY SIMPLE WORDS HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED.

15. I RECOUNT THIS AT SOME LENGTH BECAUSE THERE IS OBVIOUSLY RISK IN SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT 242. MY ONLY POINT IS THAT OUR JOB NOW IS TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLES OF 242--WHICH ARE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES IN THE POST-UN CHARTER WORLD--IN A SITUATION WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN 1967, IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN THAT SADAT HAS NOW VISITED JERUSALEM.

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